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The U.S. Army's main battle tank, the M1A1, does not possess the enhanced
features of the proposed M1A2 tank. Limited production authorization for the
M1A2 will result in only 62 M1A2 tanks reaching the Army's inventory. The U.S.
Army needs to determine if certain technologies from the M1A2 should be
retrofitted to existing M1A1 tanks.
The Commander's Independent Thermal Viewer (CITV) is among the most
promising add-ons for the M1A1. A scheme to test whether addition of the CITV
alone to the M1A1, without adding any of the other M1A2 improvements, is
conducted to measure lethality, survivability, and detection performance.
The JANUS(A) combat model is used to collect data. Battalion and squadron
level scenarios were conducted for both Central Europe and Southwest Asia
during both day and night conditions. Measures of performance are analyzed in
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This thesis investigates whether addition of the Commander's Independent
Thermal Viewer (CITV) to the US Army's M1A1 Main Battle Tank (MBT) increases
the weapons system's lethality and survivability. The following chapters evaluate the
benefit of retrofitting a specified percentage of the existing fleet of M1A1 tanks with
certain technologies developed for the M1A2 tank.
B. BACKGROUND
1. M1A2 Program History
The M1A2 program was approved on 19 February 1985 as a fightability
enhancement of the M1A1 tank. In actuality, the M1A2 tank is a near-total redesign
which shares certain core component characteristics with the existing M1A1 tank.
The fightability enhancements approved in February 1985 included Survivability
Enhancements (i.e. improved heavier armor), an Improved Commander's Weapon
Station, a Carbon Dioxide Laser Rangefinder, a Position Navigation System, the
integration of the Driver's Thermal Viewer, the Radio Interface Unit, and the
Commander's Independent Thermal Viewer (CITV). During the course of the last
seven years the program has been revised many times.
In March 1990 a special review resulted in the decision to procure only 62
M1A2 tanks. These tanks are to be built with the Improved Commander's Weapon
Station, Position Navigation System, specified Core Architecture (i.e. digital
electronics components and databus), and the Commander's Independent Thermal
Viewer. The Secretary of Defense issued a program budget decision in December
1989 terminating M1A2 production after the limited 62 tank production run.
Although future Foreign Military Sales may warrant continued production, there is
no current U.S. plan to purchase more than the 62 tanks specified by the Secretary.
2. The Commander's Independent Thermal Viewer (CITV)
The current generation M1A1 tank is not equipped with a CITV. The
tank commander has a sight which is an extension from the gunner's primary sight
(GPS) and is not capable of any independent movement. The tank commander may
search for targets in a number of modes: he may be fully exposed (head and
shoulders outside of tank hatch) using unaided vision, fully exposed and using
binoculars or night vision goggles, in a closed hatch mode using the unaided vision
periscopes, or he may be using the tank commander's extension of the GPS in either
a daylight or thermal mode.
According to the M1A1E2 Tank Program System Specification, the CITV shall:
provide the commander with the independent capability to perform surveillance
and target acquisition with performance equivalent to the Gunner's Primary
Sight (GPS) Thermal Imaging System (TIS). In addition, it shall provide the
commander with the ability to handoff targets to the gunner and also provide
a backup means to fire the main armament system. The CITV shall be
stabilized to provide operation while the tank is stationary and on-the-move.
[Ref. 1: vol IV, p. 2]
The CITY should provide the weapon system with greater acquisition and detection
capability thereby increasing the tank's lethality (kills more enemy) and survivability
(kills enemy faster than the enemy can engage the tank).
The CITV is an independently stabilized thermal sight. This means that the
view will remain fixed in both azimuth and elevation as the tank moves. This allows
the tank commander to clearly view on-the-move. The stabilization is independent
of the gunner's sight system, thereby allowing multiple fields of view from the
weapon system. The thermal capability indicates that the sight is an infrared type,
developing an electronic image by detecting varying levels of emitted heat. Such a
design has been used for many years in both the M60A3 and Ml series tanks as well
as attack helicopters and other weapons systems. The thermal sight provides the user
with enhanced visibility and detection capabilities in times of darkness or decreased
visibility (smoke and battlefield obscurants).
The CITV enhancement is much more than a vision device, in fact, it is an
entire system. The CITV enhancement package would provide the functions of:
• Independent stabilized thermal sight
• Continuous 360° surveillance
• Detection, recognition, and identification equal to Gunner's Primary Sight
thermal system
• Backup firing and sighting system
• Enables hunter-killer (target designate) operations
• Auto scan of a selected sector
• Search and gun line-of-sight modes
Not only does the CITV afford the tank commander a better view of the battlefield,
it also allows him to designate targets not already identified by the gunner, engage
those targets himself if necessary, and relieve the gunner of sectors of scanning
responsibility.
The hunter-killer capability allows the gunner and tank commander to
independently search exclusive or overlapping sectors of responsibility. In a typical
scenario, the tank commander can issue a command for the gunner to engage a
detected target. While the gunner is in the process of engaging the known target, the
tank commander can continue to search for additional targets without interfering
with the gunner's ability to engage and destroy the known target. If the tank
commander identifies a new target, he may "designate" that target to the gunner upon
the gunner's completion of action against the first known target. The tank
commander depresses a switch on his fire control handle and the gunner's sight and
the gun align with the tank commander's CITV view axis. The gunner may now
immediately engage the new target without excessive search delays. This cycle of
engage-search/ designate-handoff-engage may continue until battle termination.
Alternately, the tank commander has backup engagement capabilities. If, for
instance, the gunner is unable to acquire the designated target, the tank commander
may engage the target with the main armament using the CITV sighting system.
Also, if the tank commander determines that the target he has identified takes
immediate priority over the target being engaged by the gunner he may supersede
the gunner's known target and immediately engage the new target. It should be
intuitively obvious that the integrated CITV system has the potential of significantly
increasing the number of targets detected, identified, and engaged/destroyed. This
capability seems especially appealing when the tank is in a defensive posture. In a
defensive scenario the tank is usually stationary, in defilade or a prepared position,
and generally enjoys the advantage of being able to see the enemy much sooner than
the enemy is able to detect the tank's location.
C. PROBLEM STATEMENT
The United States Army is committed to supplying the soldier with the best
possible equipment. At the same time, the Department of Defense is coming to
grips with the fiscal realities of expensive weapons systems acquisition. In an effort
to determine an appropriate acquisition strategy, the US Army Training and Doctrine
Command (TRADOC) and the US Army Armor Center (USAARMC) have posed
the following questions:
1. What percentage of the current M1A1 fleet should be equipped with
selected upgrades similar to the enhancements proposed for the M1A2
tank?
2. If certain enhancements are selected, what are the tactical fielding
implications?
This thesis will focus on the former question; what the Armor Center has
called the issue of "Differential Loading". Using the JANUS(A) combat model, this
thesis will examine what measure of effectiveness increases, if any, occur when
adding the CITV capability to a fixed force incrementally. The latter question is one
of doctrine and is beyond the scope of this investigation. Naturally, any full-scale
attempt to optimize the force would necessarily involve an investigation of cost
factors. No attempt is made to include cost as a measure or to quantify its impact
on procurement issues. This thesis will solely address the impacts on battlefield
performance.
The following chapters detail the methods used to approach the problem.
Chapter II discusses the JANUS(A) combat model and explains the modifications
necessary to use the simulation for this thesis. Chapter III covers the measures of
performance and measures of effectiveness used and lays the foundations for Chapter
IV, the analysis of the data produced using the simulation. Finally, Chapter V
presents conclusions and highlights areas of possible further study.
II. MODELING THE CITV
The JANUS(A) combat model is used to create scenarios and generate data
necessary to analyze the performance of the CITV enhancements. It is necessary to
modify the JANUS(A) source code to represent the multiple sensor capability of the
CITV-equipped tanks (in fact, the use of the improved sensor algorithms better
represents the acquisition of any crew-served weapon system in general.) A cursory
overview of the JANUS(A) combat model is presented to motivate the modifications
made to allow independent sensor application.
A. THE JANUS(A) COMBAT SIMULATION
JANUS(A) is a high-resolution, stochastic combat simulation developed and
released by TRADOC Analysis Command, White Sands Missile Range (TRAC-
WSMR). It is written in approximately 85,000 lines of FORTRAN-77 and configured
to run on Digital Equipment mainframe or minicomputers running the VAX VMS
operating system. JANUS(A) provides the user the ability to build very specific,
realistic combined arms scenarios that are relatively easy to modify and manipulate.
The user interface is via two methods: a standard VT220 display and keyboard
combination or a graphics screen/mouse combination. Once a scenario is loaded and
initialized, the user may interrupt the simulation, make modifications, or abort the
run. There is moderate flexibility in the simulation, and it is easy to learn.
1. JANUS(A) Search and Detection/Acquisition
As this thesis is primarily an evaluation of additional detection hardware,
it is necessary to examine how JA_NUS(A) models acquisition. The current
JANUS(A) version uses an adaptation of the Night Vision Electro-Optical
Laboratory (NVEOL) search and detection model. [Ref. 2:pp. 352-365] This widely-
used model mathematically computes a probability of detection of a single target by
a lone observer.
Modeling of detection and acquisition is essentially a two-phased process.
JANUS(A) must model the physical system or stimulus presented by a target and the
acquirer's response to the stimulus. The physical stimulus is limited by a detector's
capabilities. A detector or sensor may be optical, such as unaided human sight or
magnified sight, or thermal. In the case of optical sensors, the limiting physical
characteristic is the number of "cycles" resolved by the observer on the target. The
measure in cycles is the finest resolvable difference in contrasting adjacent lines
distinguishable by the observer. A calculation of the resolvable cycles is dependent
upon the contrast of the target as it appears to the observer's sensor, the number of
cycles per milliradian that the sensor can resolve given the contrast level, and the
target's presented dimension and range. In the case of thermal sensors, contrast is
defined as the "absolute value of the average target to background temperature
difference." As will be discussed later, this method of detection is important to the
combat modeling methods presented in Chapter III.
The observer's response is dependent on a number of physical and technical
parameters. Every 20 seconds of simulation time a list of at most 5 potential target
units is composed. The following conditions must be satisfied:
1. the observer must have line-of-sight to the target
2. the observer must resolve a sufficient "cycle ratio" on the target unit, and
3. the target must be in the observer's sector of search (defined by the user).
If there are more than 5 targets satisfying the listed criteria, only the 5 with the most
cycles are put on the potential detection list.
Under JANUS(A) version 2.0, a weapon system may have no more than 2
sensors, however, only one sensor is used at any given time. Based on user-defined
parameters, the simulation alternates between primary and secondary sensors, using
only one at any given time, until a detection occurs. Each 2 seconds of simulation
time an observer queries the potential detection list and attempts to "acquire" the
target. A random Uniform (0,1) draw is made for each potential target and
compared to a calculated probability of detection for the given target. If the draw
is less than or equal to the computed probability of detection, the target is acquired.
The target will remain on the acquired list until the target is no longer within the
observer's field of regard, line-of-sight is lost, or the target is destroyed.
Additionally, JANUS(A) assumes that a detection is equivalent to positive
identification (classification), and, once detected, the target is eligible for engagement
(i.e. placed on a target list).
A weapon system may be in full or partial defilade when not moving, that is,
either fully or partially hidden, or fully exposed. When not in defilade, a weapon
system's search sector, which I will refer to as field of regard, is a circle centered at
the weapon system, with a radius of "visibility" based on both physical and technical
limitations. When in defilade, the field of regard is restricted to a wedge with locus
at the weapon system and azimuth set by the user. Both the azimuth and angular
width of the field of regard are set by the user. When moving, a weapon system has
a full 360° field of regard.
There is a difference, however, between field of regard and field of view. The
former may be thought of as an assigned area to search or scan while the latter is a
limitation due to the hardware. Hardware-related specifications are set by the user
and stored in a parameter data file.
2. JANUS(A) Limitations
As with any simulation, there are many limitations to the JANUS(A)
combat model. The following areas are the limitations which significantly affect the
evaluation of the CITV upgrade. JANUS(A) is used with no "man in the loop",
assuring reproducibility, but negating many interactive capabilities. The first three
limitations could be addressed by using a group of qualified experts to act as the man
in the loop for each side, adding to the realism but reducing the reproducibility of
the experiment. The last two limitations may be addressed with software
modification to the model, but were beyond the scope of this thesis.
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a. No synergistic information sharing
The JANUS(A) combat model is an aggregation of many individual
weapon systems battles; each weapon system operates as though alone on the
battlefield versus the enemy. As detections occur they are not shared with other
members of the platoon or company, nor is the intelligence passed to higher echelons
of command. Additionally, visual cues, such as adjacent tanks firing or being fired
upon, are not simulated. If a target is acquired or engaged by one tank, the
information on enemy location, type of enemy systems, speed, movement axes, and
suspected intent is not shared with anyone. The implication here is that if the
information was shared some type of effect on the force performance should be
seen. If the CITV provides detections at greater range or more detections at a given
range a reasonable assumption is that information would be shared, resulting in a
higher force effectiveness.
b. No interactive artillery or aviation coordination
Another instance of suppressed information sharing concerns the
coordination of combined arms. The simulation was systemically run for a group of
scenarios. Artillery was represented by preplanned fires only; aviation routes for Air
Force close air support and Army aviation assets were preplanned as well. On an
actual battlefield, if the addition or deletion of sensors contributed to more
detections or, in particular, detections at greater ranges, artillery may have been
called. The effect of additional sensors may be detections at ranges well beyond the
tank's main gun capability. If such detections occur it would be reasonable to
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request heavy artillery, Air Force close air support, or Army aviation to attrit lead
enemy elements at long ranges. Once again, since JANUS(A) does not allow
information sharing or conditional mission assignment, the potential increase in force
effectiveness or force lethality may not be realized.
c. No intermediate degradations
There are no partial kills such as mobility-only or firepower-only in
JANUS(A). If a target is engaged the results are classified as either a catastrophic
hit (kill) or a near-miss (suppressed). A suppressed target is incapable of firing for
a short period of time, but once the suppression period has expired the weapon
system is once again fully capable. Also, there are no "phantom targets", that is,
engagements that result from the gunner or tank commander identifying a
nonexistent target. Firing at phantom targets is not an uncommon occurrence and
can affect ammunition expenditure rates. Finally in this area, once targets are
destroyed they may no longer be detected; they are totally removed from the
battlefield. The recent Gulf War has shown many examples of targets with tens or
even scores of penetrations due to multiple engagement by many firers. Once again,
the lack of this realism contributes to ammunition expenditure inaccuracies for both
sides.
d. No fratricide
Friendly forces do not "see" each other in JANUS(A). Since no
detection of friendly forces occurs no fratricide occurs. The Army is sensitive to the
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fratricide issue and studies have been conducted to attempt to add fratricide
capabilities to JANUS(A). The version of JANUS(A) used in this thesis was not
equipped with the fratricide capability.
e. No RAM play
There was no representation of reliability, availability, or
maintainability of the weapon systems used in the simulations. A system was 100%
operational until suppressed or killed.
B. THE TRAC-MTRY INDEPENDENT SENSOR ALGORITHM
1. Background
The TRADOC Analysis Command-Monterey (TRAC-MTRY) developed
a prototype JANUS(A) independent sensor algorithm. The expressed purpose of the
algorithm was to support analysis of the CITV.
TRAC-MTRY is interested in enhancing JANUS(A) to more accurately
reflect true battlefield conditions. An Ml-series tank has a four man crew.
Although there are times when all four crewmen can conceivably be searching for
targets, in reality the driver and loader are either preoccupied with their respective
duties or otherwise hindered by physical limitations from searching for targets. The
tank commander and gunner have the primary responsibilities for searching for and
acquiring targets. As noted previously, the tank commander is capable of searching
independently of the gunner in the current tank configuration, albeit without an
independent sight. Ideally, the independent sensor algorithm should be capable of
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emulating a wide range of sensor combinations, from unaided vision (exposed tank
commander) to the proposed best-case (CITV).
2. Synopsis of Independent Sensor Methodology
The Independent Sensor Algorithm methodology capitalizes on the
JANUS(A) technique of allowing systems to be "stacked" or mounted on a "host"
system. Using the mounting method, the user identifies which systems are hosts
(gunners) and which are riders (commanders). The crux of the enhancements is a
group of FORTRAN subroutines, essentially modifications to the original source
code, that merge the detected target lists from the mounted and host systems, screen
for duplications, and prioritize targets for engagement based on user-defined
parameters. Further, weapons capabilities are removed or suppressed from the
mounted system, i.e. his firing capability is limited to the weapons systems of the host
(gunner). Within JANUS(A), as well as within the military, withholding firing
authority is termed "hold fire." The net effect of this technique is that it allows the
user to relate up to two more sensors, now independent of the original sensor(s),
with the host weapon system. Appendix A lists the specific steps necessary for
current JANUS(A) users to implement the TRAC-MTRY Independent Sensor
Algorithm. Refinements to the original prototype code were necessary to allow more
than one type of commander system to be linked with a gunner system. The
modified code is found in Appendix B. Test runs were conducted to ensure all
combinations of commander-gunner pairings and the order of entry in the JANUS(A)
preparatory screens were valid.
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C. ASSUMPTIONS
There are a number of assumptions that must be made in order to attempt to
model the combat capabilities of the CITV. First and foremost it is assumed that the
JANUS(A) model is an acceptable representation of the battlefield. There are also
assumptions to be made concerning the performance of the weapon systems.
1. The TRAC-MTRY Independent Sensor Algorithm is valid
The modifications to JANUS(A) that represent the merging of the target
lists were tested by Major James C. Hoffman, Deputy Director, TRAC-MTRY.
Additionally, enhancements were made to allow multiple sensor types to be
associated with the same host system type. Additional implementation pilot tests
were conducted to ensure that detections from the mounted system were being
placed on the total system's detected list and that engagements were resulting from
the mounted system detections.
2. Tank Commanders and gunners search continuously
This is a JANUS(A) limitation. The Government's General Accounting
Office (GAO) [Ref. 3:pp. 35-37] heavily criticized the Army for the methods used to
represent the CITV during the M1A2 Cost and Operational Effectiveness Analysis
(COEA) conducted in 1989. Specifically, GAO criticized the Army analyst's
assumptions that an M1A1 tank commander never searches for targets while an
M1A2 tank commander, equipped with a CITV, always searches for targets. This
appears to be a reasonable criticism. By using the Independent Sensor Algorithm,
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the issue of an M1A1 commander never searching may be resolved. A non-CITV
equipped M1A1 is represented by mounting an individual soldier on the host M1A1
and integrating the sensor capabilities of the soldier with the tank. Hence, we have
represented the non-CITV tank commander by an integrated, independent optical
sensor while the CITV-equipped M1A1 tank commander is represented by the CITV
sensor. The remaining drawback is that both sensor systems are assumed to be
continuously functioning. There is no degradation due to concurrent duties, sleep,
etc. While this limits the realism of the simulation, it provides a much greater
degree of realism for performance comparison than was previously available. Further
modifications to the underlying detection algorithms could be reasonably
accomplished to represent a fractional proportion of actual search-related time.
3. Weapons systems performance characteristics of M1A2 do not transfer
same enhancement to a CITV-equipped M1A1
Certain measures of weapon system engagement capabilities are
significantly different between the M1A2 and the M1A1. These technical measures
have been documented by the Army Materiel Systems Analysis Activity (AMSAA)
at Aberdeen Proving Ground. Specifically, there is a measurable difference in the
lay time of the weapon systems. The lay time, generally, is the amount of time
necessary to move the gun and sights so that the gunner/commander may begin the
precision process of aiming the gun. AMSAA has documented a noticeably shorter
lay time for the M1A2 system. It was assumed that all of the proposed upgrades for
the M1A2 system were in effect during the testing. One cannot assume that the
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addition of only one component of the M1A2, the CITV, would contribute the same
amount of decrease in the lay time, if any at all. The M1A2 includes a digital
electronics structure as well as a different fire control architecture which may have
been the predominant reason for the decrease. It is assumed that the CITV
contributes no advantage or disadvantage to lay time.
4. There are no special logistical considerations for employing a mixed level
of CITVs
Logistics considerations were assumed to not influence battle
performance.
5. Tactical scenarios are appropriate
The scenarios were developed from base scenarios already in existence
at TRAC-MTRY and the Armor School at Fort Knox. The final forms of the
scenarios were the result of personal experience in armor assignments in both
Central Europe and the Mojave Desert.
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III. STUDY METHODOLOGY
A. SCOPE OF THE STUDY
This thesis examines force performance when different percentages of CITV-
equipped tanks are in the force structure. To conduct the study, two basic scenarios
were developed: a Central European armor task force defense and a Southwest Asia
cavalry regimental defense in sector. No offensive scenarios were developed since
it was believed that if any differences were to occur they would be most profound,
and therefore most easily measurable, in defensive scenarios.
For each location both a day and night technical database were developed.
Three levels of CITV allocation were examined: none, one CITV-equipped tank per
platoon or section, and three CITV-equipped tanks per platoon or section. This
structure results in a well-balanced experimental design. The general test scheme is
summarized in Table I.
B. TEST SCENARIOS
Two scenarios each with the various CITV allocations, are studied. The two
geographical areas were chosen due to their diversity. In Central Europe, the terrain
limits both acquisition and engagement capability, as well as hindering movement.
In Southwest Asia the terrain has only minor impact on the acquisition and
engagement process. Stopping criteria were established for each scenario. In both
18
cases a time limit and a physical boundary were set. The simulation was terminated
if the time limit was reached or if the threat forces penetrated the specified gridline
with a certain force size. Threat forces were equipped with better than currently
fielded equipment. Next-generation tanks and infantry fighting vehicles outfitted with
weapons systems such as breach launched anti-armor missile systems were used.











1 SW Asia Day
1 SW Asia Night
3 Europe Day
3 Europe Night
3 SW Asia Day
3 SW Asia Night
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1. The Central European Scenario
The Central European scenario battlefield is near the German town of
Brietenbach. The terrain is highly compartmentalized, has numerous towns, and is
transected by the Fulda river. The area of operations is broken into many small
engagement areas, none of which allow for consistent long range engagements.
Potential targets are visible for only short periods of time at extended ranges before
they disappear behind concealing terrain. The terrain is expected to influence
detection capability, tending to make detection (and, by extension, engagement)
ranges short. Relative combat power is shown in Table II.
Table II RELATIVE COMBAT POWER, CENTRAL EUROPE
COMBAT POWER: CENTRAL EUROPE SCENARIO
WEAPON SYS BLUE THREAT RATIO
TANKS 30 40 1:1.333
CFV/IFV 32 93 1:2.906
RECON 18
OTHER* 41 44 1:1.073
TOTAL 103 195 1:1.893
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2. The Southwest Asia Scenario
The Southwest Asia scenario is in a desert area that is very flat. The area
has long fields of view with virtually uninterrupted line-of-sight. There are few
manmade obstacles and only a small number of towns or urban areas. The terrain
is easily trafficable and allows long range detections and engagements. This area
represents almost a complete reversal of the hindrances of the Central European
scenario. Relative combat power is shown in Table III.
Table III RELATIVE COMBAT POWER, SOUTHWEST ASIA
COMBAT POWER: SOUTHWEST ASIA SCENARIO
WEAPON SYS BLUE THREAT RATIO
TANKS 38 106 1:2.789
CFV/IFV 41 61 1:1.487
RECON 66
OTHER* 43 274 1:6.372
TOTAL 122 507 1:4. 156
C. ALLOCATION OF CITVs
As shown in Table I, CITV-equipped tanks were added to the force on a one-
for-one basis for non-CITV equipped tanks. Initial runs were conducted with no
CITVs allocated. The tank commanders were represented by a soldier with naked
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eye or binocular-type optical sensors. The tank commander was capable of
independent sensing within the given field of regard for the tank. For each scenario
runs were conducted after equipping one tank per platoon with a CITV and then
three tanks per platoon with CITVs. In the case of non-platoon level tanks, such as
company and battalion/squadron commanders, the CITVs were added for both the
one per platoon and three per platoon runs.
D. DAY VERSUS NIGHT IN JANUS(A)
The JANUS(A) combat model does not explicitly represent day or night. In
order to simulate a weapon systems' capabilities during daytime, darkness, or periods
of limited visibility, the user must manipulate the technical parameters that describe
a sensor's performance. This is done by changing the values for a sensor's minimum
resolvable contrast in cycles per milliradian or minimum resolvable temperature (see
Chapter II). The JANUS(A) database was changed to reflect the different technical
MRC or MRT curves according to data available in the TRAC-MTRY archives.
Thermal sight capabilities were assumed to remain unchanged from day to night,
image intensification type sights were set operational at night only, and unaided




Three replications were conducted for each scenario at each CITY level for a
total of 36 replications. Each replication was started with a unique random number
seed for all stochastic processes. Collected data elements are shown in Table IV.
































Analysts at TRAC-MTRY have written a concise data collection post-processor
for JANUS(A) that significantly eases the data collection and management effort.
Further data reduction was done using simple FORTRAN programs (Appendix E)
to extract data thought pertinent to this study.
F. MEASURES OF PERFORMANCE/MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS
Two principle areas were investigated: the force effectiveness in terms of
casualties inflicted or sustained, and changes in detection capability. Both areas are
assumed to be influenced by the addition of CITV capability to the tanks in the Blue
force. The hypotheses are that the CITV yields greater detection capabilities and
that, with these greater capabilities, the Blue forces will inflict more casualties on the
enemy while sustaining fewer losses. The following measures of performance (MOP)
or measures of effectiveness (MOE) were used to test these hypotheses:
1. Force Effectiveness Measures
a. Absolute Red Losses Inflicted by Blue forces
This is a simple measure, but provides insight into the force's
lethality.
• Number of Red Tanks Killed by Blue Tanks
• Number of Red Tanks Killed by All Blue Systems
• Total Number of Red Weapon Systems Killed by all Blue Weapon Systems
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b. Absolute Number of Blue Tanks Killed by All Red Systems
This MOE gives a rough indication of force survivability. If the
CITV provides enhances detection capability, this MOE should decrease as the
number of CITV-equipped tanks increases and the volume of enemy detections
increases.
c. Loss Exchange Ratio
This is a measure of blue effectiveness that quantifies both the blue
force's capability of inflicting losses and the blue force's own survivability.
Number of Red LossesLoss Exchange Ratio
Number of Blue Losses
This is a traditional MOE frequently used when comparing materiel or doctrinal
issues.
d. Relative Loss Exchange Ratio
Another widely used MOE, this provides us with a measure that
accounts for two major blue force interactions: The numerator is a measure of the
blue force's lethality or destructive capability, while the denominator measures blue's
survivability. This is traditionally viewed as the measure of force effectiveness. [Ref.
4]
Number of Red Losses
Relative Loss Exchange Ratio = ^d Initial Strength




a. Median Range of Detection and Distribution of Detection Ranges by
M1AI (Blue) Tanks
General comparisons among the scenarios and levels of CITV are
made using graphical techniques such as notched boxplots and histograms.
Comparisons of median detection range as well as distributional descriptive statistics
are used to determine if the detection capability of the tank force is sensitive to any
of the main factors of location, level of CITV, and day versus night.
b. Median Range of Detection and Distribution of Detection Ranges by
Sensor
Similar to a. above, comparisons between sensor types are made
using various graphical techniques.
c. Detection Efficiency Ratio (DER)
The detection efficiency ratio (DER) is a measure of effectiveness
that attempts to determine a sensor's contribution to the total detection capability
of a weapon system. The DER is defined as:
£ NUMBER OF DETECTIONS BY SENSOR TYPE i
V NUMBER OF DETECTIONS BY ALL SENSORS
£ NUMBER OF SENSOR TYPE i
J^ALL SENSORS
where sensor types include unaided optical (eye), CITV, gunner's primary sight-
optical, and gunner's primary sight-thermal and the summation is over all replications
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for a particular location, CITV level and day or night for all targets. The DER
measures how well a particular sensor contributes to the volume of detections
compared to the percentage of the sensor population belonging to that particular
sensor. This measure is useful when making comparisons within the same scenario,




This chapter provides the analysis used to determine if adding the CITV
enhanced the force effectiveness of the U.S. (blue) units. Two areas are pursued:
force effectiveness (both lethality and survivability) and detection capability.
Analysis proceeds as an investigation of the raw numbers, graphical displays to
ascertain trends, and analysis of variance to determine if measurable differences exist
between or among the data sets.
A. DATA
Pertinent data is summarized in tables in Appendices C and D. Data was
collected as described in Chapter III.
B. ANALYSIS
1. Force Effectiveness Measures
This section focuses on the traditional measures of effectiveness: average
losses for each side, loss exchange ratios (LERs) and relative loss exchange ratios
(RLERs).
cl Average Red Tank Losses Inflicted By Blue Tanks
Refer to Appendix C for casualty data. Average red tank losses
inflicted by blue tanks were calculated for each cell using simple averages for the
three replications. Results are shown in Figure 1. On first inspection it appears that
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the M1A1 improves in its ability to kill red tanks as the level of CITV increases in
the european scenarios, while performing less effectively in the desert environment.
AVERAGE RED TANKS KILLED BY BLUE TANKS
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Figure 1 RED TANKS KILLED BY BLUE TANKS
In order to determine if the three factors (CITV level, Day vs Night, and Location)
influence the lethality of MlAls versus red tanks, a three factor ANOVA was
performed. Four hypotheses were tested at the a = 0.05 level:
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1. H'G : Level of CITV has no effect.
H'
a :
Level of CITV has some effect
2. H" : Day vs Night has no effect.
H"
a
: Day or Night has some effect
3. H'" : Location has no effect.
H'"
a :
Location has some effect
4. H'"' : Interaction effects all = 0.
H""
a
: Some interactions exist.
In each case the null hypothesis is rejected if the F-ratio is greater than the
established critical value at the appropriate degrees of freedom. For red tanks killed
by blue tanks, hypothesis H'" is rejected (78.146 » f 05(2,24) = 3.40); there is strong
evidence that there are differences in the number of red tanks killed by blue tanks
in the two locations (Europe vs Southwest Asia). Table V shows that two-factor
interactions do not appear significant. This is somewhat surprising. One would
expect the CITV, with its technical superiority to unaided vision, to be more effective
at night and in the desert then in the day or in Central Europe. Finally, H'Q cannot
be rejected: the effect of the level of CITV appears not to contribute to the number
of red tanks killed by MlAls.
b. Average Red Tank Losses Inflicted By All Blue Systems
An identical approach to that taken in a. above is used for the next
two sections. Once again, the observer is inclined to believe that the force
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Table V ANOVA, RED TANKS KILLED BY BLUE TANKS
Analysis of Variance for RED TANKS KILLED BY BLUE TANKS

















































RESIDUAL 506.05556 26 19.463675
TOTAL (CORR.) 2103.0000 35
missing values have beer excluded.
effectiveness increases in European scenarios as the number of CITV-equipped
MlAls increases (Figure 2), while remaining nearly unchanged in the desert
environment. The ANOVA approach is again employed to determine if the various
factors influence the number of red tanks killed. The 5% level of significance critical
value of the F-statistic is 3.40 for CITV effects and 4.26 for location effects. Again
it is apparent that there are no two-factor interactions, that location is significant, and

















AVG RED TANKS KILLED BY ALL BLUE SYSTEMS






















Figure 2 RED TANKS KILLED BY ALL BLUE SYSTEMS
c. Average Blue Tank Losses Inflicted By All Red Systems
The survivability of the M1A1 fleet is addressed using the average
blue tank losses to all red systems as a measure of effectiveness. Blue M1A1 losses
remained nearly constant as CITV-level increased. Using the ANOVA table in
Table VII, it is seen that two-factor interactions exist between CITV level and
Day/Night even though, as a main effect, CITV is not significant. This may be
attributable to high influence from the CITV European night scenarios. Two of the
three observations are much lower than any other scenario. This significant
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Table VI ANOVA, RED TANK LOSSES TO ALL BLUE SYSTEMS
Analysis of Variance for RED TANKS KILLED BY ALL BLUE SYSTEMS

















































RESIDUAL 335.05556 26 12.886752
TOTAL (CORR.) 2478.2222 35
missing values have beer excl uded
.
departure is probably a result of variability or random chance that two very low
results were found in the same cell. As before, location has great influence on the
performance and, in this instance, there is significance in the day versus night
scenarios.
d. Loss Exchange Ratios
The loss exchange ratio (LER) is presented for completeness. As
noted in Chapter III, the LER provides a rough measure of the killing efficiency of
a force. Data presented in Table VIII and Figure 3 show an increase in LER when
one CITV is added per platoon but no corresponding increase when the CITV level
is three per platoon. The case of Southwest Asia shows that the LER is higher for
three CITV per platoon than for none, however when the performance increase is
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Table VII ANOVA, BLUE TANK LOSSES
Analysis of Variance for Blue Tank Lo sses from Al
1
Red Systems

















































RESIDUAL 204.16667 26 7.8525641
TOTAL (CORR.) 1920.9722 35
missing values have been excl uded
.
considered with the analysis of the previous sections the conclusion remains that the
level of CITV does not contribute to a dramatic increase in force effectiveness.
e. Relative Loss Exchange Ratios
The relative loss exchange ratio (RLER) is considered a good
measure of both the force's effectiveness in inflicting casualties as well as indicating
the force's survivability. Table IX and Figure 4 present the findings for RLER. The
large drop in RLER for the European scenarios with three CITV per platoon is
attributed to both the overall increase in blue losses and a marginal decrease in the
efficiency of killing red systems. RLER is consistent with all other measures used;
increasing the level of CITV does not correspond to an increase in the RLER.
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Table VIII LOSS EXCHANGE RATIO
LOSS EXCHANGE RATIO (LER)





1 S.W. ASIA 2.651





This section explores whether the addition of the CITV influences the
tank's detection capability. Detection range, number of detections, and the
distribution of detection ranges are used to examine two areas: the model's
representation of the integrated sensors' capabilities and what impact, if any, the
addition of the CITV had on detection capabilities.
cu Representation of Tank Commander and CITV
The number of detections, detection range, and day versus night
differences between the CITV and the surrogate tank commander show that the
technical capabilities of the CITV are well-represented in JANUS(A). Figure 5





















Figure 3 LOSS EXCHANGE RATIO
boxplots may be used as a data analysis tool to compare the medians of various
sample populations. [Ref. 5:p. 62] Sample size is represented by the width of the
boxes. Non-overlapping notches are strong evidence that the means of the two
samples are not equal. The notched boxplot clearly shows that the volume of
detections is greater for the CITV than the unaided tank commander (eye) even
though the aggregate ratio of unaided tank commander sensors to CITV was 1.56:1.
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Table IX RELATIVE LOSS EXCHANGE RATIO
RELATIVE LOSS EXCHANGE RATIO (RLER)




S.W. ASIA 1. 100
1 S.W. ASIA 1. 180
3 S.W. ASIA 1. 168
COMBINED 1. 181
1 COMBINED 1. 256
.J COMBINED 1. 204
Although there are fewer CITV systems represented in the scenarios, they account
for more total detections than the unaided tank commander. The median detection
range for the CITV is well above that for the eye, and the notches of the boxplots
do not overlap. The non-overlapping notches are a good indication that differences
exist between the performance of the CITV and the unaided tank commander.
Investigation of performance segregated by location or day versus night shows similar
patterns of behavior.
The percentage of detections attributed to each sensor indicates that the CITV
returns more detections per sensor than the unaided tank commander. Table X
shows the percentage of total blue tank detection systems attributed to either the
CITV or the unaided tank commander as well as the percentage of all detections
37





































































Figure 4 RELATIVE LOSS EXCHANGE RATIO
credited to either sensor. Table XI displays the detection efficiency ratio (DER).
The DER is a measure of how well the sensor contributes to detections relative to
the number of sensors in the total sensor inventory. A value of one indicates that
the sensor is contributing the same proportion of detections as its percentage of total
sensors. A sensor that is very efficient could, theoretically, have a DER greater
than one, while a poorer performer may have a very low DER. The DER gives an
indication of how well a sensor performs under specific circumstances, such as
38
Notched Box- and -Whisker Plot
































EYE THERMAL OPTICAL CITV
Sensor
Figure 5 DETECTION RANGE BY SENSOR
location or environment. These differences are readily apparent in Table XI. The
performance in Central European scenarios of the CITV is mixed. The unaided tank
commander has a higher DER than the CITV in two of the four scenarios. This may
be attributable to the more broken terrain, intermittent line of sight, and closer
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Table X SENSOR PERFORMANCE





































1 22.22 11.11 11.83 3.06






33. 33 0.00 25.29
1 22.22 11.11 18.78 6.09










33. 33 0.00 1.37
1 22.76 10.56 3. 18 1.83







1 22.76 10.56 5.90 3.88
3 3.25 30.08 1.18 26.60
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Table XI DETECTION EFFICIENCY RATIO
DETECTION EFFICIENCY RATIO (DER)












































detection ranges. In all four of the comparable categories in Southwest Asia
scenarios the DER for the CITV is much higher than the unaided tank commander.
b. General Detection Performance
Figure 6 and Figure 7 display representative distributions of the
detection ranges. The specific distributions for CITV level or day versus night differ
little within locations but differ significantly between Central Europe and Southwest
Asia. The spikes at approximately eighteen hundred meters and twenty-five
hundred meters in Figure 6 correspond to the terrain pattern found in the Central
European scenarios. The distribution seen in Figure 7 shows a significantly different
distribution of detection ranges. The detections begin almost immediately at the
maximum visibility range of six kilometers, with a few outliers beyond eight
kilometers. The relatively flat, unbroken terrain of the Southwest Asia scenarios
provides excellent visibility and allows the optimal use of both the optical and
thermal sights. Clearly, the large numbers of detections occur well beyond the
MlAl's main armament's maximum range approximately 3,500 meters. Again, the
distributions within the Southwest Asia scenarios differ little from Figure 7. In both
the Central European scenarios and the Southwest Asia scenarios differences in
distributions appear as changes in kurtosis; the distribution shifts a proportion of the
tail generally from shorter ranges in non-CITV cases to somewhat longer ranges with
three CITVs per platoon.
42
Frequency Histogram
DETECTION RANGE, EUROPE, DAY 3 CITV
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Figure 6 DETECTION RANGES, CENTRAL EUROPE
c. Contributions By the CITV
Figure 8 summarizes the three main factors and the impact on
detection ranges. Clearly, the ranges of detection are much longer for Southwest
Asia scenarios than Central European. It also is apparent that the median range and
interquartile ranges do not vary substantially within the Central European scenarios.
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Figure 7 DETECTION RANGES, SW ASIA
In the desert, however, differences do appear and can be attributed to the level of
CITV. Both Figure 8 and Figure 5 show a significant number of detections for the
CITV beyond eight kilometers. In fact, nearly all detections beyond eight kilometers
are from the CITV. The CITV is contributing in the Southwest Asia scenarios,
however, because of the limitations addressed in Chapter II, the model is unable to
exploit the greater detection ranges and better intelligence: the additional detections
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Notched Box- and- Whisker Plot
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Figure 8 DETECTION RANGES





The use of the TRAC-MTRY independent sensor algorithm is a better
representation of detection capability for multi-sensor weapons systems than currently
available in JANUS(A). Using the independent sensor methodology, the CITV
enhances the detection capability of the M1A1 tank. When allocated at the three
CITV per platoon level, the detection efficiency ratio in all scenarios is far superior
to the detection performance of the unaided tank commander. In the long range
detection scenarios of Southwest Asia, the CITV is particularly effective. It is
reasonable to conclude that in locations which afford long lines of sight and good
visibility that the CITV will contribute significantly to the volume of detections for
the tank. During darkness or limited visibility, the CITV-equipped tank clearly
outperforms the tank with an unaided tank commander. Both volume of detections
and ranges of detections are higher for CITV equipped scenarios.
2. Lethality and Survivability Issues
The increase in the number of detections and detection range does not
translate to greater force effectiveness within the JANUS(A) combat model. There
is no increase in lethality as measured by the loss exchange ratio, relative loss
exchange ratio, or force effectiveness measures. No appreciable difference in the
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number of inflicted casualties is supported by the data. There may be many reasons
for this result. The limitations of the JANUS(A) combat model, as outlined in
Chapter II, bear directly on these conclusions. Although the tanks are capable of
seeing more targets, in some scenarios at much greater ranges, the combat model
does not exploit the additional information. The frequency histogram of detection
ranges in Southwest Asia (Figure 7) clearly shows a large number of detections
between three thousand and six thousand meters. The distribution of engagement
ranges confirms that targets may be detected but are not being engaged. These
ranges of detection are well beyond the main armament capability of the M1A1 tank
and therefore are not exploitable by the weapon system. The tank has more than
sufficient targets on its target list by the time forces close within main gun range; the
tank cannot save earlier detections because of the number of targets presented by the
superior red force ratios. The lack of information sharing in the current
configuration of the M1A1 as well as the current weapons capabilities limit the
simulation's ability to discriminate a contribution to the force effectiveness.
B. AREAS OF FURTHER STUDY
Further research should be directed along two avenues: first, conduct detailed
analyses of the underlying algorithms of the JANUS(A) combat model as used in this
thesis and, second, explore weapon system enhancements such as breach-launched
anti-armor missile systems to possibly capitalize on the greater detection ranges
afforded by the addition of the CITV.
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Analyses of the technical parameters and underlying algorithms of JANUS(A)
are particularly important. Perhaps the model is very sensitive to changes in
technical parameters such as aim time and lay time that were assumed unaffected in
this thesis. It may be possible that minor adjustments to the weapons system
performance attributes cause significant changes in the lethality of the tank.
Application of the methodology outlined in this thesis with carefully validated and
appropriate classified technical performance parameters for both the US forces and
threat forces should also be accomplished.
Additional enhancements to the independent sensor algorithm should also be
pursued. As noted earlier, the assumption that tank commanders are continuously
searching is unrealistic. Modifications to the independent sensor algorithm or to the
existing JANUS(A) detection schemes may result in a more realistic portrayal of the




IMPLEMENTATION STEPS FOR TRAC-MTRY INDEPENDENT
SENSOR ALGORITHM
The following instructions allow installation of the TRAC-MTRY Independent
Sensor Algorithm in the JANUS(A) combat model.
I. Copy the appropriate JSCRN???.DAT file and rename it JSCRN???.OLD.
The execute the program FIXUPJSCN.EXE to ensure the appropriate JANUS(A)
interface menus are available.
II. Enter the Combat Systems Database (COMSYS.DAT) file.
a. Modify the systems characteristics (select option SY), if necessary, to set
HOST CAPACITY for Commander's system to (1) and Gunner's system to (2).
This allows the Commander's system to be mounted on the Gunner's system.
b. Verify the Detection Data (option DD) and set both primary and
secondary sensors for the Gunner and Commander systems.
c. Select Weapon Selection (FF) and set firing priorities for the
Commander's systems to (0). (Alternatively, set all Commander systems to HOLD
FIRE using the interactive screen after executing the scenario.
d. Return to JANUS(A) Main Menu.
III. Build or modify the appropriate force files FF from JANUS(A) Main Menu).
The Commander/Gunner pair must be adjacent entries in the force file, with the
Commander weapon system type preceding the Gunner weapon system type.
IV. Execute your JANUS(A) scenario. (Select EE from JANUS(A) Main Menu).
a. Four JANUS(A) menu screens now exist rather than three. The fourth
screen allows the user to indicate which commander/gunner pairs to match for the
scenario. Up to five pairs per side are allowed.
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b. The interactive screen will initialize with duplicate weapon system
symbols, one for the commander and one for the gunner, on the screen. Verify that
the Commander systems are in HOLD FIRE. Use the MOUNT command to place
the Commander systems on the Gunner systems. Ensure that the correct pairing is
matched, i.e. that the preceding Commander system in the Force File is mounted on
the subsequent Gunner system, (e.g. system 35 is mounted on system 36).
V. Your JANUS(A) scenario is now ready to run using the TRAC-MTRY
Independent Sensor Algorithm. Weapon system performance and maneuver will
function as any mounted system in standard JANUS(A). Field of regard for the
Commander will be limited to the field of regard of the Gunner, however, the
detections will be integrated.
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APPENDIX B
INDEPENDENT SENSOR INITIALIZATION FORTRAN CODE
C SUBROUTINE-INITCITV J.C.HOFFMAN, TRAC-MTRY
C DEC 91
C MODIFIED 30 APRIL 92





C PURPOSE: To build and initialize an array of pointers which
C indicate which unit correspond to systems with
C "Independent" sensors such as the CITV.
C
C Independent sensors are portrayed by defining
C one unit as the "Commander's" system and one
C unit as the "Gunner's system.
C
C In the FORCE definition file, the Gunner's Unit
C must immediately follow the entry for the Commander's
C unit.
C
C On Janus Screen IV, the CSD System number (types) of
C the Commanders' weapon system definitions must be
C paired to the corresponding CSD System numbers
C of the Gunners' weapon system definition. Five
C pairings are possible for each side.
C
C During the Planning Phase, the appropriate Commander's
C Unit must be set to HOLDFIRE (if the Commanders's
C system definition has weapons which can fire) and
C MOUNTED on the appropriate Gunner's Unit.
C
C EXAMPLE:
C If Commander's Unit number = 4,
C then it must be mounted on Unit number 5.
C Unit 5 must be a Gunner's System which is
C paired to the system type of unit 4, (the
C Commander's system) on Janus Screen IV.
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c
C****** USE ONLY WITH GROUND SYSTEMS WHERE COMMANDER'S
AND
C GUNNER'S SENSORS ARE OPTICAL OR FLIR
C
C ****** ALGORITHIM IS NOT TESTED TO WORK WITH LASER
C DESIGNATOR,






C ******MODIFICATIONS ALLOW MULTIPLE CDR-GNR PAIRINGS,
THAT IS, A GUNNER SYSTEM TYPE MAY HAVE MULTIPLE UNITS





DO 300 KSIDE = 1, NUMSIDES
DO 200 KUNIT = 1, KNUMUNITS(KSIDE)
C - Set up Data consistency checking values
KCURCSD = KCSDTYP( KUNIT,KSIDE )!CSD type of current unit
IF ( KUNIT .GT. 1 ) THEN
KPREVCSD = KCSDTYP( KUNIT-1,KSIDE )!CSD type of previous
C Isystem
ELSE
KPREVCSD = !Set previous CSD to zero
C !for the FIRST unit (i.e., KUNIT = 1)
ENDIF
C -- Set up flags for each unit which indicate the type of system
C
C = Normal Janus unit (No independent sensor)
C 1 = Unit is a Gunner's system of an independent sensor pair
C -1 = Unit is a Commaner's system of an independent sensor pair
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C TYPE *, KUNIT,KSIDE, KCURCSD,KPREVCSD
DO 100 K = 1, 5 !Five is the current number of independent
C Isensor system pairs possible on Janus Screen IV
C TYPE *, IPAIR(KSIDE,K,1),IPAIR(KSIDE,K,2)
C -— Determine if current unit is designated as a commander
IF ( KCURCSD .EQ. IPAIR( KSIDE,K,1) ) THEN
C ICurrent unit is a Commander's independent sensor system
C -- Check of data consistency error
IF ( KUNIT .EQ. KNUMUNITS(KSIDE) ) THEN
TYPE *, 'INDEPENDENT SENSOR DEFINITION ERROR
******'!Commander cannot be
TYPE *, ' COMMANDER SYSTEM NOT PAIRED WITH GUNNER' !the
last unit in
TYPE *, KSIDE,' = SIDE',KUNIT,' = UNIT'
! Force definition
ENDIF
KSYSCHAR( KUNIT,KSIDE ) = -1
!Set Commander flag
C TYPE *, 'KSYSCHAR = \KSYSCHAR(KUNIT,KSIDE)
GOTO 200 IConsider next unit
ENDIF
100 CONTINUE
C — Determine if unit is a gunner
DO 105 KK=1,5
IF ( KCURCSD .EQ. IPAIR( KSIDE,KK,2) ) THEN
C ICurrent unit is a Gunner's independent sensor system
C -- Check of data consistency error
IF (KUNIT .EQ. 1) THEN
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C IGunner cannot be the first defined unit
C
TYPE *, 'INDEPENDENT SENSOR DEFINITION ERROR ******'
TYPE *, ' GUNNER SYSTEM CANNOT BE FIRST UNIT IN FORCE
FILE'
TYPE *, KSIDE,' = SIDE',KUNIT,' = UNIT
GOTO 200 ! Consider next unit. Flags for
C ! merged tgt list processing will
C ! NOT be set. Error in FORCE file
C ! will default Independent sensor
C ! system to the Gunner's system.
C ! Commander's Target Acquision will
C ! have no influence in this case.
ENDIF
C Check if previous unit is a valid commander, if YES, then
C check if the previous unit is a valid match to the gunner
DO 110KKK=1,5
IF(( KPREVCSD .EQ. IPAIR(KSIDE,KKK,1)) .AND.
+ (IPAIR(KSIDE,KKK,2) .EQ. IPAIR(KSIDE,KK,2)))THEN
KSYSCHAR( KUNIT,KSIDE ) = 1 !Set Gunner flag
C TYPE *, 'KSYSCHAR = = \KSYSCHAR(KUNIT,KSIDE)
IPAIRMAP( KUNIT,KSIDE ) = KPREVCSD !Set flag
C [defining Cdr
C !CSC system type
C !for this gunner.
GOTO 200 ! Consider next unit
ENDIF
110 CONTINUE
C If no valid match then an error condition exists
C Gunner not paired with a valid commander
C
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TYPE *, 'INDEPENDENT SENSOR DEFINITION ERROR
TYPE *, ' GUNNER SYSTEM NOT PAIRED WITH A VALID
COMMANDER'
TYPE *, KSIDE, ' = SIDE', KUNIT, ' = UNIT
GOTO 200 ICheck next unit
ENDIF
105 CONTINUE
C Otherwise, the current unit is not designated as either
C a commander or a gunner. Set system flag to 0.
C
KSYSCHAR( KUNIT,KSIDE ) = !Set normal Janus Unit flag
C TYPE *, 'KSYSCHAR = = = ', KSYSCHAR(KUNIT,KSIDE)
C TYPE *, KSIDE,' = KSIDE',KUNIT,'
KUNIT\KSYSCHAR(KUNIT,KSIDE)
200 CONTINUE !Over all units





CASUALTY DATA SUMMARY REPORTS: SCENARIOS
















































1 19 37 108 20 50
2 25 40 107 17 45
3 21 36 100 19 50
1
1 24 39 116 20 51
2 19 37 101 19 49
3 28 40 108 19 50
3
1 23 38 107 19 49
->
31 38 101 19 50






1 21 34 104 11 33
2 30 38 111 15 41
3 25 38 102 14 39
1
1 24 35 101 13 40
2 23 39 114 9 32
3 29 37 112 8 31
3
1 25 38 117 13 37
2 26 38 106 16 44
3 29 40 105 16 44
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1 9 20 127 27 56
2 19 27 153 26 57
3 19 27 153 26 57
1
1 7 19 139 36 64
2 12 17 142 33 62
3 8 20 143 27 54
3
1 13 27 158 30 56
2 12 21 146 27 56






1 10 21 144 31 60
t 10 21 144 31 60
3 10 21 144 31 60
1
1 12 25 143 27 52
->
10 26 146 25 51
3 17 31 154 20 44
3
1 3 15 130 26 52
2 12 27 139 26 51
3 20 28 140 24 50
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APPENDIX D
SUMMARY DATA/STATISTICS FOR DETECTIONS





Sample size 1897 1927 1963
Average 2.06784 2.04242 2.06946
Median 2.13 2.048 2.156
Mode 0.628 0.628 0.595
Geometric mean 1.85313 1.83633 1.84277
Variance 0.645132 0.607982 0.669777
Standard deviation 0.803201 0.779732 0.818399
Standard error 0.0184413 0.0177625 0.0184716
Minimum 0.07 0.07 0.082
Maximum 4.428 4.236 4.667
Range 4.358 4.166 4.585
Lower quartile 1.595 1.576 1.597
Upper quartile 2.624 2.618 2.635
Interquartile range 1.029 1.042 1.038
Skewness -0.194967 -0.209897 -0.265939
Standardized skewness -3.46672 -3.76159 -4.81024
Kurtosis -0.169832 -0.196124 -0.256209
Standardized kurtosis -1.5099 -1.75738 -2.31712
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NIGHT CENTRAL EUROPEAN SCENARIOS





Sample size 2388 2379 3052
Average 2.1242 2.20585 2.13898
Median 2.109 2.294 2.2535
Mode 0.83 1.352 1.352
Geometric mean 1.91255 2.01682 1.86537
Variance 0.687722 0.659911 0.865863
Standard deviation 0.82929 0.812349 0.930518
Standard error 0.0169703 0.016655 0.0168435
Minimum 0.048 0.046 0.046
Maximum 4.461 5.264 4.525
Range 4.413 5.218 4.479
Lower quartile 1.5955 1.652 1.441
Upper quartile 2.6925 2.735 2.734
Interquartile range 1.097 1.083 1.293
Skewness -0.0496248 -0.0451489 -0.0661504
Standardized skewness -0.990011 -0.899019 -1.49193
Kurtosis -0.352845 -0.314405 -0.65043
Standardized kurtosis -3.51962 -3.13026 -7.33478
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DAYLIGHT S.W. ASIA SCENARIOS





Sample size 16749. 17881. 19698.
Average 4. 480931 4. 511059 4. 55953
Median 4. 52 4. 519 4. 589
Mode 3. 403 4. 196 4. 646
Geometric mean 4. 364821 4. 41034 4. 44323
Variance 0. 941253 0. 840367 0, 958451
Standard deviation 0, 970182 0. 916715 ,979005
Standard error 0, 007497 0. 006855 ,006975
Minimum 1 .002 1,,006 .393
Maximum 7 834 9 ,402 9 .551
Range 6 ,832 8,,396 9 .158
Lower quartile 3 .779 3 .843 3 .884
Upper quartile 5 .327 5 .282 5 .383
Interquartile range 1 .548 1 .439 1 .499
Skewness -0 .300801 -0 .209779 -0 .194196
Standardized skewness -15 .892696 -11 .45204 -11 .126921
Kurtosis -0 .624881 -0 .533563 .042434
Standardized kurtosis -16 .507676 -14 .563847 1 .215693
Coeff . of variation 21 .651354 20 .321515 21 .471626
60
•- NIGHT S.W. ASIA SCENARIOS





Sample size 16416 16748. 18420.
Average 4 256046 4.347324 4.432285
Median 4 255 4.374 4.496
Mode 4 253 4.157 4.35
Geometric mean 4 126921 4.213905 4.296982
Variance 1 018239 1.05243 1.063516
Standard deviation 1 009078 1.02588 1.031269
Standard error 007876 0.007927 0.007598
Minimum 757 1.12 0.309
Maximum 7 813 8.183 12.956
Range 7 056 7.063 12.647
Lower quartile 3 514 3.624 3.707
Upper quartile 5 0545 5.1735 5.258
Interquartile range 1 5405 1.5495 1.551
Skewness -0 118827 -0.185066 -0.181251
Standardized skewness -6 215444 -9.777591 -10.042669
Kurtosis -0 786408 -0.447471 0.530963
Standardized kurtosis -20 567251 -11.820629 14.709698





JOHN K. WOOD, Naval Postgraduate School, June 92
THIS PROGRAM READS THE TRAC-MTRY PM POST PROCESSOR CASUALTY
REPORT OUTPUT FILE AND RENUMBERS LIKE-NUMBERED OPPOSING
WEAPON SYSTEMS. DATA COLUMNS FOR TIME, KILL TYPE, RANGE,
SIDE OF VICTIM, VICTIM SYSTEM TYPE, SIDE OF KILLER,
KILLER SYSTEM TYPE, AND KILLING MUNITION ARE WRITTEN TO AN
OUTPUT FILE. THE USER MUST INPUT THE SOURCE FILE (A PM-
FORMATTED KILXXXXX. RPT) , AND DESIGNATE AN OUTPUT FILE.
k-k -k-kick -k-k-k-kic^c -k -k-k*-kick -k -k-k-k-k -k -k-k -k ~k -k ~k V-r •
REAL TIME, RANGE
INTEGER KILLCAT, SIDEVIC, VICTYPE, SIDEFIR, FIRTYPE, MUNTYPE
INTEGER SCN
CHARACTER INFILE*12 , OUTFILE*12
it ~k -k "k 'kk -k -k -k-k -k -kickic-k -kkk-k-k -k -k -k
EXPLANATION OF VARIABLES: *
TIME: Time of casualty in fractions of minutes
RANGE: Range to victim in 1000s of meters;
MINE KILLS are shown with 0.0 range and kill code 9




















Side of the victim
Weapon system type of victim
Side of firer/killer
Weapon system type of firer/killer
Type of killing munition used
Scenario number










PRINT *, 'INPUT THE NAME OF THE INPUT FILE'
PRINT *, 'REMEMBER TO INCLUDE THE .RPT EXTENSION! IN QUOTES'
READ *, INFILE
PRINT *, 'YOU HAVE ENTERED THE FILE: ', INFILE
PRINT *, 'INPUT THE SCENARIO NUMBER. INTEGER ONLY! NO QUOTES!'
PRINT *, 'EXAMPLE: 92 '
READ *, SCN
PRINT *, 'DESIGNATE A 12 CHARACTER OUTPUT FILE NAME WITH QUOTES'
PRINT*, 'EXAMPLE: DIRF101 1 . OUT
'
READ *, OUTFILE
OPEN(UNIT=10, FILE = INFILE, MODE='READ')




KCAT RANGE SIDEV VICT SI
62
PRINT *, 'PROCESSING THE CASUALTY FILE: ', INFILE, ' TO OUTPUT
& FILENAME: ' .OUTFILE
5 READ(10,10,END=40) TIME, KILLCAT, RANGE, SIDEVIC, VICTYPE,




* WE WANT TO CHANGE THE WEAPON SYSTEM CSD INDICATORS TO AVOID *
* CONFUSION FROM BOTH THE RED SYSTEM AND BLUE SYSTEM HAVING *
* THE SAME CSD SYSTEM NUMBER. I HAVE SIMPLY ADDED 900 TO *
* RED SYSTEMS NUMBERS. *
******************************************************************
IF (SIDEFIR .EQ.2) THEN
IF((FIRTYPE .EQ. 55) .OR. (FIRTYPE . EQ . 51) .OR.
& (FIRTYPE .EQ. 3))THEN
FIRTYPE = FIRTYPE + 900
ENDIF
ELSEIF (SIDEVIC .EQ.2) THEN
IF((VICTYPE .EQ. 55) .OR. (VICTYPE . EQ . 51) .OR.
& (VICTYPE .EQ. 3))THEN
VICTYPE = VICTYPE + 900
ENDIF
END IF
IF (KILLCAT. EQ. 9) RANGE =0.0
25 WRITE(11,30) SCN, TIME, KILLCAT, RANGE, SIDEVIC, VICTYPE,
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*
THIS PROGRAM READS THE TRAC-MTRY PM POST PROCESSOR DETECTION*
REPORT OUTPUT FILE AND RENUMBERS LIKE -NUMBERED OPPOSING *
WEAPON SYSTEMS. DATA COLUMNS FOR TIME, SENSOR TYPE, RANGE, *
SIDE OF SENSOR, SYSTEM TYPE, SIDE OF TARGET, AND TARGET TYPE*
ARE WRITTEN TO AN OUTPUT FILE. THE USER MUST INPUT THE *
SOURCE FILE (A PM- FORMATTED DTCXXXXX. RPT)
,
AND DESIGNATE *
AN OUTPUT FILE. *
k-k-k-k-k-k-k-k •k -k-k-k-k-k-k-k-kic-k-k-k-k-k-k-kick -k -k -. -k-k-k-k-k-k-k-k-k-k-k-k-k-k-k-k-k-k-k-k-k-k-k
REAL TIME, RANGE














EXPLANATION OF VARIABLE NAMES: *
TIME: time of detection in fractions of minutes *
RANGE: range to target in 1000s of meters *
SCN: Designator for scenario number: e.g. 92 *
SENSOR: Sensor designator: See COMSYS.DAT file *
Side of detector *
Side of target *
Weapon System Designator of detecting system *















'INPUT THE NAME OF THE INPUT FILE'
'REMEMBER TO INCLUDE THE .RPT EXTENSION! IN QUOTES'
INFILE
'YOU HAVE ENTERED THE FILE: ', INFILE
'INPUT THE SCENARIO NUMBER
'EXAMPLE: 92'
SCN
MUST BE INTEGER! NO QUOTES!'
'DESIGNATE A 12 CHARACTER OUTPUT FILE NAME'
'EXAMPLE: DIRF101 1 . OUT
'
READ *, OUTFILE
OPEN(UNIT=10, FILE = INFILE, MODE='READ')






TIME SENSOR RANGE SIDED D
INFILE, ' TO OUTPUTWRITE(*,*) 'PROCESSING THE DETECTION FILE:
& FILENAME: '.OUTFILE
READ(10,10,END=40) TIME, SENSOR, RANGE, SIDED, DTCSYS, SIDET,
& TGTSYS
FORMAT(F10.5,1X,I3,1X,F7.3,1X, II ,4X, 13 , 24X, II ,4X, 13)
64
* *
* WE WANT TO CHANGE THE WEAPON SYSTEM CSD INDICATORS TO *
* AVOID CONFUSION FROM BOTH THE RED SYSTEM AND BLUE SYSTEM *
* HAVING THE SAME CSD SYSTEM NUMBER. I HAVE SIMPLY ADDED *
* 900 TO THE RED SYSTEM NUMBERS. *
* *
*************************************
IF (SIDED .EQ.2) THEN
IF((DTCSYS .EQ. 55) .OR. (DTCSYS . EQ . 51) .OR.
& (DTCSYS .EQ. 3))THEN
DTCSYS = DTCSYS + 900
ENDIF
ELSEIF (SIDET .EQ.2) THEN
IF((TGTSYS .EQ. 55) .OR. (TGTSYS . EQ . 51) .OR.
& (TGTSYS .EQ. 3))THEN
TGTSYS = TGTSYS + 900
ENDIF
ENDIF
IF( (SIDED. EQ.l) .AND. ((DTCSYS. EQ. 51) .OR. (DTCSYS . EQ . 52) .OR.
& (DTCSYS. EQ. 69) ))THEN
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*
THIS PROGRAM READS THE TRAC-MTRY PM POST PROCESSOR DIRECT *
FIRE REPORT OUTPUT FILE AND RENUMBERS LIKE-NUMBERED OPPOSING*
WEAPON SYSTEMS. DATA COLUMNS FOR TIME, RANGE, SIDE, FIRER *
SYSTEM TYPE SPEED OF FIRER, TYPE WEAPON, SIDE OF VICTIM,
VICTIM SYSTEM TYPE, AND SPEED OF VICTIM ARE WRITTEN TO AN
OUTPUT FILE. THE USER MUST INPUT THE SOURCE FILE (A PM-





REAL TIME, RANGE, SPEEDF, SPEEDV







EXPLANATION OF VARIABLE NAMES:
TIME: time of engagement in fraction of minutes













side of the firing system
Weapon system designator of firing system
Weapon of Weapon system used for engagement *
Side of victim *
Weapon system designator of victim *
Scenario designator *
For an explanation of Weapon System Codes see the JANUS(A) *
COMSYS.DAT file. *
********************
PRINT *, 'INPUT THE NAME OF THE INPUT FILE'
PRINT *, 'REMEMBER TO INCLUDE THE .RPT EXTENSION! IN QUOTES'
READ *, INFILE
PRINT *, 'YOU HAVE ENTERED THE FILE: ', INFILE
PRINT *, 'INPUT THE SCENARIO NUMBER. MUST BE INTEGER! NO QUOTES!'
PRINT *, 'EXAMPLE: 92'
READ *, SCN
PRINT *, 'DESIGNATE A 12 CHARACTER OUTPUT FILE NAME'
PRINT *, 'EXAMPLE: DIRF1011 . OUT
'
READ *, OUTFILE
OPEN(UNIT=10, FILE = INFILE, M0DE='READ')





TIME RANGE SIDEF F-TYPE SPDF WPN
PRINT *, T n OCESSTNG '
& FILENAME: ' , OUTFILE
NGAGEMENT FILE INFILE TO OUTPUT
READ(10,10,F.ND=AO) TIME, RANGE
& SIDEVIC, '.'ICTYFE, SPEEDV
SIDEFIR, FIRTYPE, SPEEDF, WPNTYPE,
66




-A- -A- -A- -A- -,V -A-***7n*VoV**************************
* *
* WE WANT TO CHANGE THE WEAPON SYSTEM CSD INDICATORS TO AVOID *
* CONFUSION FROM BOTH THE RED SYSTEM AND BLUE SYSTEM HAVING *
* THE SAME CSD SYSTEM NUMBER. I HAVE SIMPLY ADDED 900 TO *
* THE RED SYSTEM NUMBERS. *
* *
* -k -k -k-k-k-kic-k -k"k-k-k-k-k -A- ~k -A- -A- -k -A- -A- -A- -A-& -A- -A' -A- -A- -A- -A- -A- ~k -k -A- -A- -A- -A- -k -k ~k -A- -A- -A- -A-* -A- -A- -k -k -k-k-k-k-k-k-k-k-k-k-k-k-k-k-k-k -k
IF (SIDEFIR .EQ.2) THEN
IF((FIRTYrE .EQ. 55) .OR. (FIRTYPE . EQ . 51) .OR.
& (FIRTYPE .EQ. 3))THEN
FIRTYPE = FIRTYPE + 900
END IF
ELSEIF (SIDEVIC .EQ.2) THEN
IF((VICTYPE .EQ. 55) .OR. (VICTYPE . EQ . 51) .OR.
& (VICTYPE .EQ. 3))THEN
VICTYPE = VICTYPE + 900
ENDIF
END IF
IF( (SIDEFIR. EG. 1) .AND. (( FIRTYPE . EQ . 51) .OR. (FIRTYPE. EQ . 52) .OR.
& (FIRTYPE. EQ. 69) ))THEN
25 WRITE(11,30) SCN, TIME, RANGE, SIDEFIR, FIRTYPE, SPEEDF,
& WPNTYPE, SIDEVIC, VICTYPE, SPEEDV
30 FORMAT ( 2X , 1 3 , 2X , F9 . 5 , 3X , F5 . 3 , 4X , 1 1 , 4X , 1 3 , 4X , F5 . 2 , 4X , 12 , 4X
,










1. General Dynamics Land Systems Division Report SA-SA00001B, M1A1E2 Tank
Program System Specification for Tank,, Combat, Full-Tracked, 120mm Gun,
M1A1E2, General A brams, 16 July 1990.
2. TRADOC Analysis Command - White Sands Missile Range, JANUS(T)
Documentation, TRADOC Analysis Center, undated.
3. U.S. General Accounting Office, Abrams Tank, Block II Modifications Not Ready
to Enter Production, GAO/NSIAD-90-57, Government Printing Office,
Washington, DC, February 1990.
4. U.S. Army Combat Developments Command, USACDC Pamphlet Number 71-1,
Force Developments The Measure of Effectiveness, Fort Belvoir, VA January 1973.





1. Defense Technical Information Center 2
Cameron Station
Alexandria, VA 22304-6145
2. Library, Code 52 2
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, CA 93943--5002
3. Dr. Lyn R. Whitaker, Code OR/Wh 2
Department of Operations Research
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, CA 93943-5004
4. Dr. William Kemp I e, Code OR/Ke 2
Department of Operations Research
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, CA 93943-5004
5. United States Army Armor Center 1
Director of Combat Developments
ATTN: ATSB-CD-ASI) (Mr. Vowels)
Fort Knox, KY 40121-5215
6. Commander 1
Operational Test and Evaluation Command









X. Captain John K. Wood
20 Plum Shore Road










policies for the Com-
mander's Independent
Thermal Viewer on U.S.





policies for the Com-
mander's Independent
Thermal Viewer on U.S.
Army main battle tanks.
ff^4wM

